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Abstract – There is increasing pressure on medical
practices to use digital information systems for storage of
patient data. Some consideration is given to protecting
these systems from a external or “ hacker” focus. This
paper looks at the issue that the increasing use of digital
information systems has for insider malfeasance.
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Introduction

In various nations of the world medical practitioners are
being encouraged or forced into using computer based
information systems for the storage, processing and
transmission of medical records. Many of these records are
being transmitted across the Internet and are often sent
encapsulated as plaintext formats such as e-mail making
interception of the medical information a relatively trivial
task.
It is well documented in the computer security literature
and surveys that insiders are a significant risk to systems
integrity. The other alarming trend is that inside attacks are
often the most successful and damaging in terms of money
and loss of reputation. This is typically as a result of the
insider having intimate operational knowledge that an
outsider must either socially engineer and extract from the
organization or bypass in the case of security
countermeasures.
One of the prime motivators for moving to the ubiquitous
use of medical records in digital form is cost and the
quality of care delivered for the cost. Traditionally medical
records have been kept as paper based indexes often with
the filing compactors holding the records being the
dominate feature within a medical practice.
These paper records were offline in the true sense of the
word, if any one wanted to obtain the medical record one
had to have physical access to the file storage device in this
case a filing cabinet or compactor to obtain the file.
Furthermore to take a copy of the file one then had either
copy notes about the file to a notepad by hand or have

access to a photocopier or simply purloin it. Some of the
problems intrinsic to copying the medical information in
this manner is that unless the filer is organized it could be
could be difficult or time consuming to locate information
initially. If the information is not organized alphabetically
or by incident, or uses chronological placement of
information within the file locating the exact piece of
information could take considerable time. The increased
time makes the threat of discovery in commission of the
breach escalate considerably. This means that such a
breach is a high risk activity for commission by an outsider
but is a profile well suited insider malfeasance. The insider
however still runs the risk of discovery either in
commissioning of the breach or egress of the information
across the physical practice boundary.
There is little argument that a modern database centric
information system, typically based on SQL, will garner
significant cost savings and strategic advantage for an
organization principally in timely delivery of information
for legitimate purposes. Further, cost savings can be found
in significantly reduced storage space required to house
records. a standard 2m tall rack with a foot print of 0.25m2
or 0.5m3 can hold a server and several terabytes of storage
space. This could replace several rooms of paper based
storage realizing savings in reduced rental costs for floor
space and given that many medical practices are located in
high rental value areas this could be substantive. Records
of this type normally have considerable periods for
retention of the record that is mandated often via
legislation.
Further advantage can be gained through the timely
retrieval or interrogation of medical records from a
database system. Little labour expense is now expended in
the physical retrieval and re-storage of the record itself a
further significant cost saving.
A counter to this is that speed of compromise and
specific targeted attack for illegitimate purposes by an
attacker is also likely to gain significant advantage through
the use of digital systems on networks. With digital records
several risk factors for the intruder in the compromise of a
file are significantly reduced or even moot. This is further
compounded if the internal network is connected to the
Internet. The risk of covert retrieval, destruction,

modification or discovery of medical records is now
significantly increased and some of this risk is coincidental risk. This is where the medical record for
example is transmitted co-incidentally as a product of
malicious activities and not as a specific target of an
activity. In this scenario a mass mailing malware program
that simply finds documents or existing emails on a hard
disk and emails them to people within the address book
could have devastating and real effects.
This paper will explore the issues the move towards
medical information systems and their increasingly on-line
interactions have for medical practitioners and the threat
from insider malfeasance.
Many medical organizations are being as mentioned
before being coerced or cajoled into installing IT based
systems by governments or suppliers to replace paper
based record systems with cost being touted as one of the
main drivers. Little if any thought is often given to the
security of that data at rest on the hard disk of the database
server. Furthermore, now as other suppliers of medical
diagnostics in the form of pathology tests, x-ray or
ultrasound are generating their data in electronic forms
they too for reasons of efficiency and costs savings are
moving to electronic delivery of results. The fax machine is
supplanted now with an email of results to the requesting
health professional further extending the problem domain.
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2.1

Infrastructure
Networking and Servers

Most medical information systems contain customized
SQL database applications that run on specialized and
dedicated server architectures.
These databases are
normally accessed by client PCs which are distributed
across a network typically using Ethernet within the
physical confines of the medical business. Furthermore,
these networks are increasingly now being linked to the
Internet typically via broadband connection such as ADSL
with access speeds as high as 24Mbits per second.
The infrastructure described is relatively complex in
computing terms and some exploration of the attendant
risks for medical practices in particular will be undertaken
in the following sections. Firstly, there is typically a SQL
database server which contains the actual client databases
which contain the digital records of the customers. These
records not only record textual data but may also contain
scans, diagnostic results and graphical images of patients.
These databases need to be maintained, patched and
secured against a large range of threats requiring highly
specialised skills nearly always beyond the scope and
capabilities of IT support mechanisms within medical
practices. The SQL database engines themselves are

vulnerable to exploit and there are many documented
instances of this on computer security sites such as CERT,
AusCERT and vendor specific sites such as Microsoft or
Oracle.
What further complicates the issue for many medical
practices is that these medical applications are highly
specialized in application and therefore they are generated
often by boutique or specialist developers whose primary
focus is the generation of a competent medical records
system and not security. Hence, the applications
themselves may contain serious security flaws or errors of
logic resulting in exploit that could allow escalation of
privilege either within the database or the underlying
operating system. Many of these potential exploits due to
the low profile of many of these companies may go
undetected for considerable lengths of time.
SQL Servers are increasingly open to malicious attack in
the form of SQL injection attacks [1-3]. These types of
attack allow malicious users to inject or modify the data
contained in a database structure from a Web-based
interface that uses a scripting language such as PHP or
Microsoft ASP to accept and pre-process input. These sort
of attacks can be perpetrated by any individual with access
to the scripting language either via a Web interface or a
command line, allowing external or internal compromise.
Client access to the database systems will normally be
done through a customized client interface often using Web
technologies to enable it. It is also reasonable to assume
because these systems are used in a trusted environment
often they will have lower enforced security settings. The
job function of a medical secretary is often to update notes
and other annotations as directed by the medical
practitioner. The ability to do this means, that a secretary
must have high levels of access to the database, that in
other systems typically they would not have such a high
level of access.
2.2

Internet connection

Many medical practices are now also being forced to use
the Internet for communications and conduct of normal
practice business. Diagnostic tests such as pathology and
x-rays are increasingly corresponded in electronic formats.
In addition many medical supply companies now have
online ordering systems which are accessed across the
Internet to effect the rendering of goods and services. In
some cases doctors particularly specialists are using Web
sites to promote their businesses and acquire customers.
This now sees many medical practices using broadband
technologies on a 24/7 basis exposing not only the
connecting PC but potentially the entire medical
information system to compromise.

Broadband connection itself brings many advantages to
the user including increased speed of download and the
ability to search and work faster for instance however,
these same capabilities also work to aid an attacker. In the
same way that a legitimate using the system can download
information up 100 times faster than conventional analog
modems so too can attackers send and receive at increased
speeds[4]. The greater use of bandwidth across the Internet
connection allows an attacker when internal or external to
hide their attack within bigger data streams than is possible
with conventional analog modems. What makes some
medical practices high-value targets is the type of data they
store such as before and after photography of cosmetic
surgery for instance. Some other groups may also want to
access patient medical histories for example before
employing them or insuring them. It is far easier for a
malicious insider to readily re-transmit this data at
broadband speeds on the Internet than the conventional
methods of physically accessing and duplicating the
physical asset.
With many of these medical practices being small in size
they typically will use personal firewall products which in
some cases were found to be defective[5]. Fortunately,
many of the new operating systems such as Windows XP
Service Pack 2 and hardware devices such as ADSL
routers have firewalls and other countermeasures turned on
by default. However, most Internet-based countermeasures
are typically externally focused and are not well suited to
detecting insider malfeasance. With the introduction of
broadband into these practices it will allow insiders for
instance use personal data stores on the Internet to hive
stolen data with little risk of detection.
It has been shown in previous studies that systems that
are not regularly patched are susceptible to a wide range of
attacks and this includes networking hardware. Many of
these attacks allow for remote execution of code on the
victim system an example of this is MS03-26 [6] whose
vector of exploit is a specifically crafted TCP packet sent
to the victim machine. The receipt of this packet on a
vulnerable machine then allows for remote procedure calls
(RPC) to be made to the victim machine from the attacker.
RPC allows the execution of programs or utilities on the
system for instance format C: or del *.* with impunity.
Similarly insiders will have intimate knowledge of the
patch level of systems and will be able to use suitable
malware to attack the system. This would allow for
possible remote compromise in non-business hours from a
remote location such as a home based ADSL connection as
the insider already know the IP and the level of
vulnerability in the system. So traditional scanning
activities an outside attacker would have to perform is
moot and compromise of the system is almost assured with
insider knowledge.

As well as traditional viruses and worms there is the
increasing use of targeted spyware programs[7]. Unlike
conventional viruses and worms these spyware programs
are specifically built to extract confidential data from
systems such as passwords to then enable full compromise
of the system at will. This emergent trend is worrying as
unlike previous malware vectors its purpose is not wanton
destruction of systems for fun but specific targeted
activities for potential profit through theft or fraud. An
insider can literally load these types of programs at will
onto internal systems and have them report results to an
external server for later collection and use or even
internally to their computer.
2.3

Memory gone in a flash

There has been massive expansion in the growth of flash
memory technologies such as USB memory sticks, SD
memory sticks, portable storage and playback devices such
as IPOD, MP3 players. Staff in medical practice regularly
bring these devices into their work environment with little
if any observation or auditing of activity. Examples of the
real threat that these devices pose will now be illustrated.
USB memory sticks can now be purchased that are 16
GB in raw storage capacity and are small enough to be
readily concealable. Using text files and compressive
technologies on such large memory sticks it is feasible to
store up to 200 GB of raw data posing significant threats
for protection of data. For example it could be possible to
store all of the medical records from a sizeable practice on
one stick using a simple SQL database ASCII text file
dump routine that contains SQL queries and table
constructs for the whole database. Similarly, saving all
word processing documents in text format and storing them
on the stick is possible. Detection of such activity would
be beyond most medical practices and in fact many IT
enabled enterprises.
USB memory devices allow for targeted extraction of
information about patients on to the media for later
transport beyond the organizational barrier and disclosure
and distribution to others. One of the other major problems
is a recognition that these devices are capable of carrying
computer related data for example someone walking out of
an organization which is iPod around the neck does not
send the same signal is the same individual carrying a
handful of CDs.
2.4

Tangible to Intransigent Data

Governments and supplier organizations are pushing
medical practices to move from paper-based records to
digital records. This in itself is not an illogical objective
and it has been proven in various case studies such as
McKesson’s Medical Supplies to enable significant

strategic benefit through the use of information technology.
This change however, has taken away many of the
organizational cues and clues to potential insider
malfeasance. Previously for a patient record to be
compromised typically the insider needed physical access
to the storage system or location so that they could access
the physical paper folder that contained the medical notes.
To extract this information the insider had two other
memorize, photocopy or note particularly relevant pieces
of information. This process often required several
attempts at extraction of the relevant information meaning
that there were several instances of physical potentially
seen activity that had to occur. Also, the diversity of media
often found in the physical file, everything from
handwritten notes, type letters, type notes and photographic
x-ray film made total atomic compromise virtually
infeasible.
The increasingly digital nature of the data stored on
medical systems expunges many of these visual and
physical cues that insiders would have two risk to obtain
the relevant charter.
Furthermore, the increasingly
monolithic nature of these medical databases i.e. they store
everything in digitally accessible forms in one record or
patient instance, makes theft, destruction or compromise of
this data significantly easier.
Another attack vector that was not possible or hard to
achieve with paper-based records, is that of alteration. For
instance, it is a reasonably difficult process to modify an xray film, however, for its digital equivalent it is not.
Likewise alteration of digital test results is a relatively
trivial task as many of these are sent as e-mail which are
often saved as text files which can be readily manipulated.
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Remedies

It is inevitable that medical systems will become IT
based and appropriate risk methodologies and responses
must be developed to protect these systems. Many of the
systems used in practices have parallels with out SOHO
based businesses and much of the existing literature in this
are can be leveraged to support development of best
practices in this area. Recent work by Williams [8] is
looking at developing risk assessment methods for medical
practices and this will aid in addressing these issues. There
are however, some basic security steps that can undertaken
to protect data both in transit and at rest from insider
malfeasance for minimal or low cost.
Encryption technologies can assist greatly in protecting
data in transit and at rest. Firstly, in transit the use of SSL
tunnels or enabled services such as email (POP3S, IMAPS)
or web (https) prevents compromise in transit. Secondly the
use of operating system enabled encryption such
Encrypting File System (EFS) in Microsoft operating

systems makes compromise of data more difficult for any
attacker. EFS uses per user encryption meaning that several
users can use the same PC or server and not be able to
access each others files except through a direct login using
the other users credentials. Finally the use of an at rest data
encryption tool such as a Silicon Data Vault or Seagate
(Drive) will further protect data from insider malfeasance.
Standard Operating Environment (SOE) development,
securing and restriction of same can alleviate many
problems by denying avenues for malfeasance. As an
example Windows XP SP2 now allows for policy based
restrictions to be placed on the USB ports of the machine
disallowing connection of USB based devices. The
enforcement of EFS via policy is also possible adding
further barriers to insider malfeasance.
Auditing technologies likewise will at least alert to
insider access of materials. Nearly all network operating
systems all for extensive auditing of file access on server
platforms. SQL servers have extensive logging and
auditing capabilities that can be used to track down to field
level within a record who has accessed or altered content.
This nearly always requires specialist setup but have
various easy to use tools to alert an administrator or
business owner of unusual activity.
The use of file integrity checkers such as Tripwire which
computes MD5 checksum hashes of files and notifies when
there are changes to files could also be very useful. These
integrity checkers can also be employed at PC level to
detect the installation of malware and spyware.
Monitoring of Internet usage is a simple and effective
tool that is often neglected. Tracking a users browsing or
email habits can show if a users activity has become
abnormal i.e. they have recently been sending multimegabyte files to a external email address or their
outbound web activity has increased significantly all of
these are indicators of possible malicious activity by
insiders.
The use of firewalls, anti-virus and spyware checkers
should be mandatory as should their updates. A review or
audit of these periodically will also potentially indicate
where insiders have changed configurations or allowed
activities that are not allowed such as opening the firewall
to allow file transfer, file sharing or chat clients access to
the Internet. This are again indicators of potential insider
threat either by accident or intent. Some of these changes
can also be as a result of social engineering attacks
perpetrated by chain emails.
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The move to digital records for medical data has
significantly changed the threat landscape for compromise
by insiders. Many vendors are well aware of external
threats but often are lax or discounting of the threat that
insiders pose when developing or selling product. Digitized
medical artifacts are far easier to intercept, manipulate,
destroy or transmit than their physical paper or film
counterparts. However, some simple steps can be taken to
mitigate against internal threats which also have the bonus
of hardening the systems to external attack. Many of the
suggested changes to systems come at little for no extra
expense to the system owner.
Most crimes are as a result of knowledge motive and
opportunity. Knowledge for insiders to glean useful
information as a result of digitization is lowered no longer
does the insider have to make a determination of what
notes are relevant they simply copy and transmit the entire
monolithic record. Opportunity is greatly increased as a
high speed conduit is now available to transmit the data on
or an easy concealable storage device has the capacity to
hold all data needed. Furthermore, the opportunity to be
caught doing this is greatly decreased unless appropriate
steps have been taken to internally secure the data store.
Motivation or lack thereof is all too readily overcome with
disparate proportioned cash incentives.
Urgent research needs to be conducted in this area to
identify suitable methods and frameworks to enable SOHO
or small medical practices to better protect patient records.
Finally, next time you are at your doctors and they are
happily typing in your details on their system ask them
politely how they secure your information from
compromise by staff or external attackers.
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